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INTRODUCTION
Richard H. McAdams*
Thomas S. Ulen**

I.

INTRODUCTION

A little more than 100 years ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., famously said, "For the rational study of the law the black-letter man
may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of
statistics and the master of economics."' The developments of legal
scholarship over the last twenty-five years or so have amply borne out
Justice Holmes's prophecy with respect to economics and the law. But
they have not so clearly borne out his prophecy with respect to statistics.
Empirical methods are still rare in legal scholarship: very few law professors buttress their arguments by appeal to tests of statistical significance or even with descriptive statistics. Similarly, courses in quantitative methods in the law are rare. The systematic organization of data and
its presentation in revealing ways may be a routine part of many scholarly disciplines, but it is not yet a routine part of legal argumentation.
Still, there are signs that empirical and experimental methods are
becoming more common in legal scholarship.' Empiricism is also a unifying theme of several of the increasingly influential interdisciplinary approaches to the study of law. We believed, therefore, that it would be
useful to assemble a group of legal scholars with divergent interdiscipli-

* Professor, University of Illinois College of Law.
We owe special thanks to Dean Thomas M. Mengler of the University of Illinois College of Law
and to DirectorJack H. Knott of the Institute of Government and Public Affairs for their sponsorship of
the symposium. The editors of the University of Illinois Law Review not only edited the articles in this
volume and did all the work that entails, but they were also of invaluable assistance in organizing the
symposium and in helping matters to run smoothly on April 13,2001, the date on which the symposium
was held in Champaign. We also are very, very gratefulfor the inestimable help-in many ways, not just
for this symposium-of Sally Cook and Peggy Olsen of the University of Illinois College of Law.
** Alumni DistinguishedProfessor, University of Illinois College of Law, and Professor,Institute
of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois.
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897), reprinted in 78 B.U. L. REV. 699, 708 (1998). Had he been even more prescient, perhaps Holmes would
have predicted that the man of the future study of law would often be a woman.
2. For statistical evidence of this assertion, see Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship: A StatisticalStudy, 29 J. LEGAL STuD. 517 (2000).
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nary interests but with a common interest in empiricism. ' In organizing
the Symposium, we decided to have four panels focus on three topics.
Our introductory panel would lay the groundwork for the panels to come
by discussing the need for empiricism in the study of law. The resulting
papers establish the propositions that empirical and experimental methods have already contributed a great deal to legal scholarship, that there
is a good deal more that those methods could contribute to the scholarly
understanding of the law, and that the techniques necessary to become
adept at these methods are not so daunting that legal scholars should be
hesitant to make them a routine part of their toolkits. In our second
panel, we wanted to turn from the question of scholarly ends to the question of scholarly means, to focus on how to do empirical work. The papers presented explain and explore the various empirical and experimental techniques suitable for studying law.
We wanted the final panel to turn from the why and how questions
to review the application of empirical methods to particular areas of the
law. The resulting papers survey and criticize the use of empirical and
experimental methods in diverse areas of private and public law. The authors also suggest how more experimental and empirical work would
help to throw light on important doctrinal and other issues in their areas.
In the remainder of this brief introduction to the articles presented
at the Symposium, we seek to give a flavor of these remarkably good and
nuanced articles. We strongly urge a full reading of each of the articles
to appreciate the broader arguments and subtleties that the authors
make.
II. THE PROMISE OF EMPIRICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL METHODS IN
LAW

Professor Shari Seidman Diamond, in Empirical Life in Legal Waters: Clams, Dolphins & Plankton, opened the Symposium with a provocative typology of the legal academic community and of judges and
their attitudes towards empirical legal research. She posits three general
species of legal researchers - clams, dolphins, and plankton - and three
attitudes toward empirical work-doer, user, and critic. Professor Diamond first defines each of these types and then explores each of the nine
possible combinations, such as clam-user and dolphin-critic. As an example of this typology, consider the dolphin-user. A "dolphin" is an "active inhabitant of its marine environment"4 and within the legal academy,
3. Participants included those trained in the disciplines of history, economics, education, political science, psychology, and sociology. Their methods of gathering and analyzing data vary widely,
from experiments to interviews to computer simulations, and from regression to correspondence
analysis.
4. Shari Seidman Diamond, EmpiricalLife in Legal Waters: Clams, Dolphins & Plankton, 2002
U. ILL. L. REV. 803, 808. A "Clam" in Professor Diamond's typology is sedentary and depends on
nourishment drifting to him or her through the ambient waters.
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a dolphin would include the "movers and shakers of the legal academy[,]
grounded in traditional legal scholarship [but using] empirical research to
increase our understanding of the law and to add to the tools available to
legal researchers." 5 In contrast, "plankton" passively ride the waves and
are "too weak to swim against the current."6 Their attitudes towards
empirical research reflect the prevailing moods of the profession without
being grounded in any fundamental principles.
Professor Diamond holds that the clam-user is becoming an increasingly common type in legal scholarship,7 and she does not care for that
type, feeling that their lack of judgment regarding the appropriate use of
empirical research ultimately does harm to that style of research. Professor Diamond clearly admires and places great hope in the dolphin-doers
and the dolphin-users for the future of empirical research.' She concludes her very stimulating piece with two predictions. "First, it is the
species [clam, dolphin, plankton] rather than the activities [doer, user,
critic] that will determine the future success of empirical research in the
legal world."9 And second, "the health of empirical scholarship in the legal academy will depend more on growth in the population of dolphinusers than of dolphin-doers."'"
In The Past,Present,and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship:Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, Professor Michael
Heise gives us a wonderfully complete history of empirical legal scholarship, an assessment of its current practices and its likely future trajectory,
and an illuminating case study of how a particular area of legal scholarship has been affected by empirical research.
Heise finds the origins of empirical legal research in the legal realism movement of the early twentieth century, 1 but he also notes that
empirical work declined with that movement. A revival occurred following World War II when, among other things, Dean Edward Levi of the
University of Chicago Law School and his colleagues secured a very
large foundation grant to explore the connections between law and the
behavioral sciences.12 While there was a quiescent period in empirical
legal research from the 1960s to the 1980s, "evidence suggests that the
production of empirical legal scholarship is on the rise,"" especially in
the last decade.

5. Id.
6. Id. at 813.
7. Id. at 811.
8. As examples of the dolphin-doers, she cites Phoebe Ellsworth, Richard Lempert, and Debby
Merritt, and of the dolphin-users, Richard McAdams. Id. at 814-15.
9. Id. at 817.
10. Id.
11. Michael Heise, The Past, Present,and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship:Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism,2002 U. ILL L. REv. 819,822.
12. Id. at 823.
13. Id. at 824.
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Professor Heise believes that this increase in empirical legal scholarship will continue, and he cites three reasons: (1) empirical work follows from some discernible trends in legal scholarship (such as its increasing use of social science theories); (2) an increase in the accessibility
of legally related data sets and the wider availability of personal computer-based statistical packages; and (3) encouragement for empirical
work from the leading legal academics and judges. 4
To illustrate the historical points as well as his predictions about the
future, Heise gives a fascinating case study of the empirical literature that
has sought to explain why judges decide cases in the way that they do.
That literature began with behavioral and attitudinal hypotheses (the
first holding that the socioeconomic backgrounds of judges explained
their decisions; the latter holding that their ideology, combined with socioeconomic factors, was the principal explanatory variable). 5 Heise reports that neither of these hypotheses was borne out by the facts 6 and
that this failure spurred the search for other theories (such as public
choice and institutionalism), whose work is still being done and for which
the results are not yet fully in.
In Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in Criminal Law and
Procedure-andThree Answers, Professor Tracey Meares advocates the
use of empirical methods for the study of criminal law and procedure.
She notes three objections that some criminal law theorists have raised to
the use of empiricism in this field: that the data are flawed and the courts
are unable to distinguish good from bad empirical work; that the public's
deference to the criminal justice system-its perceived legitimacydepends on our not knowing precisely how or how well it actually works
(a "less information is better" claim); and that criminal law theory should
concern itself with the articulation of rights and culpabilities that are not
subject to empirical analysis. In each case, Meares provides an informed
and compelling rebuttal: that there is good empiricism on criminal law
and workable mechanisms to demonstrate its superiority to courts; that
the "less information is better" argument is itself an empirical question,
and a doubtful one given the value of governmental transparency to perceived legitimacy; and that even rights theorists should value empiricism
because, among other reasons, the exact boundary of rights and duties
often depends on factual judgments (such as the actual behaviour of
"reasonable" persons).
Professor Tom Ulen, in A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory,
Empirical Work, and the Scientific Method in the Study of Law, tries to
put the topic of the Symposium in the larger context of sweeping changes
that appear to be occurring in legal scholarship and the legal academy.
He observes that the increasing interdisciplinarity of legal scholarship
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 826-32.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 834-35.
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over the last twenty years-especially in its use of microeconomic theory
to explain and critique legal rules and institutions-has and will bring in
its train an explicit move toward more empirical and experimental work.
Prior to the widespread use of economics in law, theorization in the law
tended to be philosophical and, therefore, posed issues that are rarely resolvable by appeal to empirical tests. But the use of economic and other
social scientific theories has also brought along, perhaps unintendedly
and unanticipatedly, a commitment to the scientific method of resolving
questions by appeal to empirical and experimental work. Ulen predicts
that this implicit commitment to the scientific method will almost certainly cause legal scholars to seek to test their theoretical constructs
against data so as to see the extent to which that empirical work supports
their theories. In this sense and to the extent that empirical work becomes more common, the study of law will become more like other disciplines for which Nobel Prizes are awarded.
Professor Rachel Croson began the next panel with Why and How
to Experiment: Methodologies from Experimental Economics. Professor
Croson's paper is a wonderfully clear and practical guide on how to conduct laboratory experiments designed to throw light on legal topics: the
"goal of this article is to... provide a guide to individuals who desire to
intelligently conduct or consume experimental research, using selected
examples from the literature in experimental law and economics to illustrate principles."' 7 She cautions that these experiments are not quite the
same as empirical reality, and that, instead, experimental results lie
somewhere between theory and reality. 8 Croson discusses, following
experimental economist Alvin Roth's typology, three types of experiments: (1) those designed to test theories; (2) those designed to address
anomalies; and (3) those designed to inform policy debates.19 She also
shows, using examples drawn from the law-and-economics literature, the
differences among experiments addressed at those different goals. The
remainder of the paper elucidates very practical and important advice
about how to structure, conduct, and evaluate experiments. This paper
could hardly be more instructive and will certainly be a standard reference in experimental legal research.
The next paper was that of Professor Ted Eisenberg and Professor
Kevin Clermont, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights
Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments. Clermont and Eisenberg
give a wonderful example of the insights into law that can come from
careful empirical work-e.g., that in federal civil trials and appeals decided since 1988, "defendants succeed more than plaintiffs on appeal...
Defendants that appeal their losses after trial obtain reversals at a 33%
17. Rachel Croson. Why and How to Experiment: Methodologiesfrom ExperimentalEconomics,
2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 921, 923-24.

18.
19.

Id. at 923.
Id. at 925-28.
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rate, while losing plaintiffs succeed in only 12% of their appeals from trials."2 The authors first explain the remarkable data set that they have
assembled from records of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts (a data set that is disseminated through the Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research) that matches federal trial
court and appellate court cases. They then use those data to follow up
on their earlier studies 21 to derive important new results. Of those results, two are particularly striking: (1) that the affirmance rate on appeal
(about 80%) is substantially stronger than previously thought (about
60%),22 and (2) that the principal explanation for the striking difference
between defendants' and plaintiffs' reversal rates on appeal in the federal
courts (a difference that is particularly striking in civil rights and torts
cases) is most likely due to misperceptions by the appellate bench about
a plaintiff-bias at the trial court level.'
Professor Bernard Harcourt presented Measured Interpretation:Introducing the Method of CorrespondenceAnalysis to Legal Studies. Harcourt notes that recently, many areas of legal scholarship have been
deeply influenced by the techniques of literary interpretation-especially
as that technique applies to the determination of the social meaning of
behavior and behavior's regulation by law. This "interpretive turn,"
Harcourt notes, presents special problems of empirical verification because social meaning is such a soft concept. Nonetheless, Harcourt argues that empirical work to establish the importance of social meaning is
important, however hard it may be to perform. To help in this work,
Harcourt introduces a technique known as "correspondence analysis,"
which is common in Europe and Japan but virtually unknown in North
America. Harcourt explains the technique, giving examples of its graphical results, and presents a fascinating case study. That case study seeks
to examine the social meaning of guns and gun possession for youth and
finds that the "symbolic realm of protection, danger, attraction, power,
jail, action, belonging, and death" 4 is closely associated with the carrying
of handguns by youth. Professor Harcourt uses the results of the case
study to draw out the public policy implications of this correspondence
analysis. For example, the analysis "suggests that antigang strategies are
likely to be an effective way to address youth gun carrying. ' Additionally, the findings may argue for the effectiveness of even broader policies, such as "a focus on youth conflict resolution, parental and school su20. Kevin Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobiain the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights
Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947,947.

21. Kevin Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: Defendants' Advantage, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 125 (2001); Kevin Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or
Judge: TranscendingEmpiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124 (1992).

22.
23.

Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 20, at 971.
Id.

24. Bernard Harcourt, Measured Interpretation: Introducing the Method of Correspondence
Analysis to Legal Studies, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 979, 1015.

25.

Id.
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pervision, safety monitoring in schools and public areas, architectural redesign, practice based alternatives and counseling. "26
The final paper of the morning sessions was Professor Randy
Picker's SimLaw 2011 in which he moves us from the present of empirical and experimental research to a very different and, he contends, highly
likely future. Picker makes a case that an increasingly important form of
legal research will be agent-based computer simulation. He playfully
suggests that just as SimCity 3000 and the Sims are the largest-selling
computer programs, so, perhaps, the future will see SimLaw 101 as a top
seller among legal academics. There are three factors that, Picker argues, will make computer simulation an attractive alternative to the more
traditional empirical and experimental methods. First, the "relative cost
of using computer simulation is decreasing, so we should expect to see
more of them."27 Second, experimental methods are becoming ever
harder and more expensive to conduct with human subjects because of
greater state and federal regulation.' And third, while there appears to
be an increase in the amount of data available for legal research, "important areas of data are still quite inaccessible and expensive to obtain."29
As a result, "[e]verything pushes in favor of computer simulations. 30
The bulk of the paper reports on a simulation directed at showing how
organized (as opposed to individual) decision making may overcome
some of the alleged behavioral biases of individual decision making.31
III. APPLICATIONS OF EMPIRICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL METHODS TO
PARTICULAR AREAS OF THE LAW

Certain fields of social science, especially sociology and psychology,
routinely publish a form of scholarship known as the review. A "review"
is a critical survey of empirical scholarship on some specific topic. Its
purpose is to provide a comprehensive overview of some area of empirical inquiry within the discipline, to assess broadly what has been learned
and what remains unknown. In a discipline where scholarship is routinely empirical and in which each article's contribution is incrementalfor example, testing a theory with one more dataset or experiment-it
makes sense on occasion to pause and take stock of where the individual
research efforts are leading, to note advances where testing repeatedly

26. Id
27. Randal Picker, SimLaw 2011, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1019, 1020. One might argue that that
same reduction would lead to an increase in the ability to do large, multiple-equation, closed-form
models, but that, he suggests, is not likely.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. To see the paper and the movies of the simulation, see http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Picker/
IllinoisPaper. The movies are set up as .avi files, which can be viewed using Windows Media Player.
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validates some aspect of a theory and to acknowledge limitations and call
for new directions where testing repeatedly fails to validate a theory.
The situation in legal scholarship is different. On the one hand, almost every law review article is expected to provide a kind of "review,"
in the sense that student-edited law reviews prefer articles that lay out a
comprehensive summary of the law the article addresses (even if other
recent articles on the same subject have provided the same summary).
Moreover, if an author articulates a new theory of some doctrine, student-edited law reviews frequently prefer that he set out and criticize
every alternative theory that has come before, and this survey is also a
kind of review. On the other hand, it is quite clear that legal scholarship
does not routinely provide anything like the review of empirical literature
that exists in many social sciences. In most legal fields, at least until recently, there has not been enough empirical literature to justify a review.
As we previously noted, however, there is an ongoing trend towards
more empiricism in the study of law. We believe that, in many fields of
law, there is now a sufficiently large body of empirical research to make
it useful for law reviews to publish, on occasion, reviews of empirical
scholarship. We are pleased to facilitate and perhaps formalize this trend
by offering here a half dozen reviews of empirical scholarship on legal
topics. In our view, each of these papers is an extremely valuable resource for understanding the state of empirical knowledge in the legal
area surveyed, and especially for determining what future empirical projects would be useful in a given area.
In Empirical Scholarship in Contract Law: Possibilitiesand Pitfalls,
Professor Russell Korobkin reviews empiricism in contracts scholarship.
Korobkin focuses on law review publications that "explicitly apply empirical analysis to the study of contract law doctrine."32 Not surprisingly
perhaps, he finds only a modest amount of scholarship that qualifies for
this category, specifically only twenty-seven articles in the fifteen-year
period from 1985 to 2000. Korobkin is thus able to provide an interesting
and insightful overview of the entire empirical literature on contract doctrine, categorizing the literature by its sources of data and by the purposes for which it is used. Korobkin then critiques the use of empiricism
in the study of contract doctrine, illustrating "pitfalls" to be avoided by
discussing the shortcomings in existing work. Korobkin concludes by
pointing to one area in which, surprisingly, there is no empiricism,
though it would be quite valuable: the effect of mandatory contract law
rules on private behavior.
Professor Gary Schwartz reviews Empiricism and Tort Law.
Schwartz notes that there are a great many empirical studies of the tort
litigation system and that (contrary to the ordinary situation) some good

32. Russell Korobkin, Empirical Scholarship in Contract Law: Possibilitiesand Pitfalls, 2002 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1033, 1064.

HeinOnline -- 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 798 2002

No. 4]

INTRODUCTION

reviews of this literature already exist.33 Schwartz addresses his review to
two issues. First, he discusses a central matter that the existing reviews,
and to some degree the existing empirical literature, has neglected: the
degree to which tort law achieves its objectives, however defined. Economic theorists generally view the goal of tort law as the deterrence of
inappropriately dangerous conduct, while corrective justice theorists
generally view the goal as compensation of victims. Schwartz provides
an overview of the existing empiricism on how well tort law does both.
Schwartz then returns to the subject of the existing reviews-the tort litigation system-and offers a critique of their "reassuring view," which he
finds to be as flawed in some instances as the "alarming view" these reviews oppose.
Professor Margaret Brinig reviews Empirical Work in Family Law.
She first critiques the existing empirical literature. She describes many
weaknesses in the data that researchers, including herself, use: most data
are collected at the state level, though there are important variations
within states; the causes and consequences of family outcomes like divorce are subtle, but much of the pertinent information is so private that
it is not collected or is protected from disclosure; many effects of family
decisions need to be measured in the long term, but the available data
usually permit only short-term study; proving the connection between
family law and behavior is difficult because we do not know how many
people actually know the law. Brinig also notes the tendency of family
law researchers to do work in fields in which they have a personal interest, raising questions about the impartiality of their analysis. The second
part of Brinig's article reviews specific areas of family law research. She
suggests that while some areas have been studied in great detail-such as
the effect of no-fault law on divorce, the effect of divorce on family
members, and the outcome of divorce settlement-there is a great need
for additional empirical work on the nonfinancial and long term effects
of divorce and a host of complex topics related to adoption.
Professor Cary Coglianese reviews EmpiricalAnalysis and Administrative Rulemaking. He surveys the empirical literature on three key
questions for administrative law scholars. First, what is the effect of the
rulemaking process, especially of rules requiring cost-benefit analysis, on
the rules administrative agencies promulgate? Coglianese identifies the
crucial theoretical assumptions in the claim that the process improves the
substantive rules, and points out which have been subject to empirical investigation. Second, what is the effect of judicial review on administrative agency rulemaking? Some administrative law scholars claim that ju33.

See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093

(1996); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992); Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic
Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994); see also DONALD
N. DEWEES ET AL., EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING THE FACTS SERIOUSLY

(1996).
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dicial review deters agencies from making rules. Coglianese describes
the empirical literature suggesting that the litigation rate against agencies
is not as high as many claim and appears not to have slowed rulemaking,
though it is difficult to get data by which one could test agency responses
to particular judicial precedents. Third, does the "consensus-building" of
negotiated rulemaking produce any advantages over conventional rulemaking? Coglianese reviews the empirical evidence that negotiated
rulemaking takes approximately as much time and produces approximately as much litigation as conventional rulemaking, though other possible advantages have yet to be studied.
In addition to these four reviews of substantive legal areas, the last
two articles provide a review of the empirical literature of a particular
kind of interdisciplinary legal scholarship. Professor Thomas Ginsburg,
in Ways of CriticizingPublic Choice: The Uses of Empiricism and Theory
in Legal Scholarship, provides a general evaluation of public choice theory, which, stated briefly, applies economic theory to politics. After describing the basic claims of public choice theory, Ginsburg reviews and
critiques the empirical literature testing its claims. In particular, an impressive body of experimental and field research demonstrates that individuals cooperate in situations where game theory predicts that they
would not cooperate. Ginsburg endorses the claim of this literature that
at least some individuals are "conditional cooperators" and/or "willing
punishers," rather than purely rational, selfish beings. Ginsburg goes beyond a mere review, however, and offers a synthesis of this new literature
with public choice theory, finding that the theory remains useful after its
necessary amendment, and concluding with a discussion of the interaction between empiricism and theory generally.
Finally, Professor Daniel Klerman reviews Statistical and Economic
Approaches to Legal History. Klerman's article advocates a fascinating
convergence of disciplines and methods. Klerman suggests that the study
of legal history can benefit greatly from the use of economic theory and
quantitative statistics. He first offers a survey of legal history scholarship
to demonstrate how rarely legal historians currently use either economics
or statistics. Klerman then reviews the limited literature that does combine these approaches, demonstrating their value for legal historians.
Statistics help to measure more precisely the course of legal change,
which in turn facilitates better tests of economic (or any other) theory
that purport to explain the change.
IV.

CONCLUSION

When we first talked about holding a Symposium about empirical
and experimental methods in law, we strongly suspected that the topic
would be one that would allow us to bring some of the most distinguished scholars in that field to Champaign. We greatly underestimated
how stimulating the resulting papers would be and the marvelous intel-
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lectual excitement that the group would have during their time at the
University of Illinois College of Law. These fourteen papers testify to
the vigor of empiricism in the study of the law. We are grateful to the authors for their efforts. And, as the dedication to this volume indicates,
we are proud to offer this marvelous collection as a memorial to our
friend and colleague, Professor Gary T. Schwartz.
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